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liNDER THE CONTRACT WAS CONDITI:JNAL, THE CONTft4CT WAS UNCON .... 
DITIONAL IN REQUIRIN:J THE PE:tFJRMANCE OF ONE OF TNO .ALTEc't-
NAT!VESti 
PuiNT THREE 
THE DE~1:NDANTS l~'.AILUrtE TO PER.II'ORM ONE OP' THE TNO AVAIL""' 
ABLE ALTEitNATlVES UNDER THE CONrrRACT CONSTITUTED A BREACH 
0!11 CONTHACT. 
POINT 11'0 UR 
THE PROPER MEASURE, OF LEGAL DAMAGES IS THE CONTRACT 
PtiCE LESS THE WHOLES1,LER 1S DELIVERED PRICE TO THE HETAILERe 
POINT FIVE 
IN LIEU OF LEGAL DAMAGES, STIPULATED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
SHOULD BE AWA1IDED UNLESS !T IS FOUND THAT EITHER (l) THE 
SUM STIPULATED IS 1 A "PENALTY", OR (2) THE SUM IS DISPl10Ei3 
PORTIONATE TO THE LEOAL DA~.GES THE REPUDIATEE WOULD BE ENTITI 
TO. 
POIWr SIX 
THI AWARD FOR STIPULATED DAMAGES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
PLAINTIFl~' OR !N THE ALTERNATIVE THE CASE SHOULD BE Fti!lUNDED 
TO ASSESS ACTUAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE RUlE O!t" 
STEWART VS@ HANSEN e 
ARGUMENT 
f9_IN1;_J?j~ 
AN ENll'OHC.iliABL~ CONTRACT WAS ENT.ErtED INTO BE1'\tr!EN PLAIN1'l] 
AND D~~'ENDANT II 
The brief ot the appellant urges the position that no 
contract was enter.ed into between plaintiff and defendant f) 
This position 1s untenable in light oi.' the facts@ 
The court need only to look at the .final portions o£ 
the negotiations between plaintiff ~md de.t'end&nt to determine 
whether there in fact was a contract between plaintiff and 
defendant, This court should apply the "reasonable man" 
teat in ev~luating and interpreting the acts o£ plainti££s 
~nd defendants in terms o£ their legal meaning and effect-
l Veness. 
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Ignoring the preliminary negotiations, when the offer 
of 36 monthly payments of ·$100 .. 00 was rejected by the plaintiff 
and counter-offer of $112 .. 00 per month was made, and defend-
ant said, ''Well, I guess that will be alright a" Reasonable 
men would have to agree that a contract came into being .. 
Perhaps defendant feels that "Dean's mistake" rescinded 
or cancelled the contract.. It is too fundamental to need 
citation that the bilateral contracts cannot be unilaterally 
rescinded or cancelledo 
When the plaintiff attempted to raise the figure to 
$118.74, (wh; ~h. by the wav- wonl rl_ not result i r q usurious 
contract, this monthly repaymen~ [36 x $118. 74_) Nould result 
in a repayment of $4,274o64 or in an excess o.r $694 .. 64 over 
the unpaid principal balance of · $3,580.00.. The maximum 
legal rate provided by DCA 15-l-2a(3) would be 1% per month 
or 36% of $3,580o00 or a finance charge of $1,288 .. 80); this I 
in no way changed the rights of the parties o Had the plaintiff I 
attempted to enforce the payments of ~118 o 74 against the ' 
defendant, the defendant could have effectively resisted., 
If she alternative is this court interprets the subse-
quent acts of the plaintiff and defend~nt as being a mutual 
rescission of contract which provided for $112 .. 00 payments, 
then this court must decide what interpretation is to be 
attached to the tender and delivery of the $3,680 .. 00 check, 
(albeit its payment was conditional).. The only reasonable 
meaning that can be given this overt act is that it manifested 
the defendants assent to the terms of the $118 .. 74/month 
contract, RESERVING, HGWEVER, THE OPTION of alternatively 
performing the contract to purchase by securing his own finan-
cing elsewhere and paying an additional $100o00 for the 
automobile e 
What other meaning could it have in view of the fact 
iliat the writing of the check was induced by, was responsive 
to, and was executed pursuant to the written option to finance 
elsewhere noted on the edge of the contract? 
Xhe whole transaction should be viewed as of the time 
it was entered into.. The question of whether or not there was 
in fact a contract sho11ld be dAt.erminPii hv ascertaining the 
intent of the parties as may be reasonable inferred or con-
cluded from their acts and words. What inference can be 
jrmm exept the intention of the defendant to say, by his 
acts and words, "I accept your contract providing for alter-
lative performance, tt and will perform one alternative or 
the other. 
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POINT Tl/0 
,. ALTHOUGH THE PERFJaMANCE OF ONE OF 'rHE ALTERNATIVES 
~UNDER THE CONTRACT WAS CONDITIONAL, THE CONTRACT WAS UNCON-
DITIONAL IN REQUIRING THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE OF . 'IWO ALTER-
NATIVES. 
In urging that the contract entered into was condition-
11, the appellant has confused the meaning of a "conditional" 
contract and a contract requiring performance in the "alter-
native." 
Quoting the case of Crane vs., Peet 4 A 72 at· · 78; 43 
NJ Eq553 WORDS AND PHRASES, unqer the caption of Alternative 
Contracts says, "(an alternative contract is) a contract 
which gives either the promisor or the promisee the option 
of electing between one of two or more al ternat'lve perform-
ances. 
Alternative contracts are such as bytheir terms may be 
performed by doing either of several ac-ts at the election of 
the party from whom performance ·is due;.,'' (See also 1 Suther= 
land on Damages p., 471)" 
POINT ·THREE 
THE- DEFENDANT 1 S FAILURE TO PERFORM ONE OF THE TWO 
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES UNDER THE CONTRACT CONSTITUTED 
A BREACH OF CONTRACT., 
Referring to Section 325 of the Restatement of Con-
~ we read: 
Breach of a contract that requires performance of one 
of two or more alternatives that the . promisor may elect 
may be caused by (a) faillire to perform at least one of 
the alternatives within the rule stated in Section 314 
of the Restatement of Contracts" 
The question is strictly academic whether or not one of 
the alternatives bei11g conditional, the rule of law was 
changed. Since it was· the defenddnts perrogative to choo~ 
between his alternatives, it makes no difference that the 
performance of one of the alternatives was conditional, and 
the other was unconditional., 
Upon the completion of the contract, the defendant had 
his choice of the two alternatives: 
1 ~~ the balance on t~ contract at $112.,00 
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per month in accordance with the contract termso (or 
$ll8o74 per month if the court finds that this was the 
contracto) 
(2) Secure his own financing elsewhere and pay off the 
entire balance by permitting the plaintiff to negotiate 
the conditionally issued checko 
Obviously the plaintiff could not require the defendant 
to perform both alternativeso If the defendant elected to 
perform alternative #1, this would act as a condition 
subsequent, voiding the check which had been issued her·etofore o 
If the defendant elected to perform alternative #2, this 
would be complete performance of the contract and would 
terminate his obligation· to make future monthly installments o 
The third alternative, which the defendant chose, namely 
perform neither al terna ti ve, is a breach .. 
If the defendant had elected alternative #l or alter~ 
native #2, the plaintiff would have had no cause to complain, 
then according to the terms of the contract, this was a 
matter of free choice to the defendant. 
However, if the defendant refuses to perform either alter-
native, it is immaterial that the contract provided for alter-
native performanceo This is the same as a simple repudiation 
of a singular covenant to perform a given act. 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF LEGAL DAMAGES IS THE CONTRACT 
PRICE LESS THE WHOLESALER'S DELIVERED PRICE TO THE RETAILERo 
The proper rule of law be applied in cases such as this 
flows from the concept that if a breach conferred a benefit 
upon plaintiff as well as causing him damages, the measure of 
recovery is the difference between the damage and benefito 
McCormick, DAMAGES, states the rule as follows: (Seco40) 
'~fuere a defendant's wrong or breach of contract has not 
only caused damage but has also conferred a benefit upon 
plaintiff which he would not otherwise have reaped, the 
value of this benefit must be credited to defendant in 
assessing damageso" 
Obviously the plaintiff cannot recover the entire contract 
balance from the defendant, because the defendant 8 s breach has 
left the pla j.; · 'gj? .. · *ln n as ( , on his hands which he would 
1 
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have otherw~e d~@h eompeiled t o purchase from the manufactureJ : 
McCormick at Section 147 continues: 
"For example, an automobile dealer sues a customer for 
refusal to carry out a contr2ct to purchase a car. The 
market value of a new car is (usually) the standard 
retail price of that model, but defendant's breach has noi 
increased the possibility of finding a new customer for 
such a caro From the agent's point of view, the supply 
of new cars from the factory is unrestricted, but the 
finding of new customers is limited, and is not simply 
a matter of offering the article upon a ready and pract-
ically unlimited market, as in the case of wheat, cotton, 
and the likeo It requires elaborate advertising, expen-
sive demonstrations and continued solicitation. The 
plaintiff recovers, then, the agreed price, less what 
he has really been saved, that is, less the cost of the 
car from the factory. (Citing Torkmian vs. Russell, 
90 Conn. 481, 97 A 760 (1916), and Stewart vs. Hansenj 
62 Utah 281, 218 Paco 959, ALR 340). 
Section 173 of McCormick on Damages (page 661) elabor-
ates on this principal further: 
In the absence of an "available market" for goods, not 
only may the seller have open the choice of fixing his 
damages by a resale, but he may often have-available 
still other formula for measuring his loss. He may 
claim compensation in the amount of the difference 
between what it has cost him to acquire the goods from 
otherso o • and the contract price. The difference is 
the seller's prospective direct (gross) profit ••• 
Not infrequent are cases of actions by dealers against 
customers for refusal to accept automobiles purchased. 
Neither 11resale price" nor nmarket value" gives any 
adequate relief, since the dea1er would ordinarilly re-sel 
at regular list price, and the market value of the 
car can be said to be the same as the contract priceo 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this principal 
in the case of Stewart vs. Hansen cited supra, and it is 
submitted that this is good law, and still the law in Utah. 
POINT .F'IVE 
IN LIEU OF LEGi.L DAMP..GES, STIPULATED LIQUIDATED D1\Mi'GES 
SHOULD BE AWARDED UNLESS IT IS FOUND THAT EITHER ( 1) THE S TJl-1 
STIPULATED IS A PENALTY, oa (2) THE SUM IS DISPROPORTIONATE 
TO THE LEGIL NltJtots 1'HE R·EPUD£1(li(_E WOULD BE OTHERWISE ENTITLED 
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'!'he sta·udl1leilt 61 law ln t his jurisdiction is set forth 
in Bramwell Investment Co. vs. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 Pac. 
2nd 913 at 916. --
This court is committed to the doctrine that, where the 
part~es to a contract stipulate the amount of damages 
that shall be paid in case of a breach, such stipulation 
is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount 
stipulated is not disproportionate to damages actually 
sustained. 
This court has never departed from this pos~tion, and 
this general rule is even cited approvingly in the leading 
case of Perkins vs. Spencer, 443 P 2nd 446 at page 449, which 
refused to sustain the liquidated damages stipulation upon 
the special facts of that case. 
Certainly, upon special findings of fact, the court may 
invoke exceptions to the general rule, as it iP done in Young 
vs. Hansen, Croft vs. Jenoen, and Perkins vs. Spencer, and 
others cited in appellant's brief. One need only to read the 
cases to see whyo In each case the court has found, as mat-
ter of fact that either (l) the stipulated damages were a 
penalty or (2) the stipulated damages were disproportionate 
to the actual damages o 
POINT SIX 
THE AWARD FOR STIPULATED DAMAGES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE CASE SHOUlD BE REMANDED 
TO ASSESS ACTUAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE RULE OF' 
STEWART VS ~~ HANSEN. 
It is common knowledge that-a $4,ooo.oo automobile has 
a greater dealer mark-up than $)00.00 and if the rule of 
Stewart vs. Hansen were applied to this case, the plaintiff 
should recover judgment in excess of $1,000.00. The def-
endant should let "well enough" alone, and not urge this court 
to look beyond the stipulated damages. If· the plaintiff is 
willing to accept an amount stipulated, although substantially 
less than his legal damages, as liquidating damages, the -
defendant has no cause to complain. The plaintiff .. is not urgir 
the issue of disproportionate damages, and the defendant, in 
his own interest and welfare, should cease to urge it. 
This Honorable Court has raised the question of the 
status of a non-negotiated check as being the basis of a 
deposit forfeiture. Upon reflection, this counsel believes 
that this is only a collateral issue. 
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The real question is not whether or not the plaintiff 
has actually received the deposit shown, but was the face 
value thereof the agreed measure of liquidated damages the 
seller should receive if the buyer breached his contract. 
Oft times ~ credit is given for a trade-in. Would it 
be reasonable to argue that the seller would have received 
nothing from the buyer until the "trade-inn had been liqui-
dated (sold)? Would it be reasonable to argue that a "side 
note" would be unenforceable if it were given as a symbol of 
the liquidated damages agreed upon. Suppose a "bearer bond" 
or "American Express Travelers Checques" or a ''postal money 
order" or a ncashier' s check" had been given as a deposit. 
While a non-negotiated check is technically a chose 
in action, in our modern business world it is the equivilant 
of cash. Bearer government bonds, Travelers Checques, 
postal money orders, bank draft::, also fall in this category 
of chases in action. Are we going to require that prospect-
ive purchasers made deposits in currency? (which +.Achnically 
is also only chose in action, being Treasury Certificates, 
Silver Certificates, or Federal Reserve Noves.) 
If this be the feeling of this court, then this counsel 
respectfully urges that no damages is so disproportionate 
to actual damages that the stipulated damage should be 
re-examined and case should be remanded to assess damages 
~der the rule of Stewart vsG Hansen. 
CONCLUSION 
A valid contract, requiring alternative performance was 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant 
refused to perform either alternative, and thusly breached 
his contract. Plaintiff would have been entitled to compen-
satory damages, but because he has agreed to a lesser sum · 
as liquidated damages, he must limit himself to such amount. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays that the judgment of the Distr: 
Court be sustained, or in the alternative, that the case be 
remanded to ascertain the actual compensc;,tory damages based u] 
a rule of law set forth in point four above, and that the 
plaintiff have his costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted 
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT 
for Plaintiff 
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